Time flies, and two weeks have passed in the blink of an eye. Chen Er's mind is now full of the Korean War. Today is June 24th, and the Korean War is about to start tomorrow. This is another arduous and difficult battle. It was another long war. In Chen Er's mind, he couldn't help but recall all the background of the outbreak of the Korean War and the unforgettable battles. On October 10, 1945, Kim Il-sung led 66 North Korean officers trained in Khabarovsk, the Soviet Union, aboard the Soviet cargo ship "Pugachev" to disembark at Wonsan Port. Soon after, they were selected by the Soviet military government to serve as North Korean military officers. leader. The reason why the Soviets wanted to replace the previously supported nationalist leader Cao Mansik with Kim Il Sung was actually related to changes in Moscow's policy on the Korean Peninsula. In the early post-war period, the Soviet Union and the United States had both conflicts and cooperation in the Far East. They needed to divide their spheres of influence while avoiding direct conflict. The establishment of the 38th Parallel on the Korean Peninsula reflected this situation. The Soviet Union's goal in North Korea after the war was initially to try to cooperate with the United States through trusteeship or other means to establish a unified Korean government in North Korea that would maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. After the conflict with the United States intensified, the Soviet Union's goal shifted to strengthening the political and economic power of northern Korea, and on this basis, promoting the reunification of the Korean nation, thereby ensuring that the unified government established through universal suffrage in all Korea would implement policies friendly to the Soviet Union. After North and South Korea successively held elections and established their own governments, the Soviet Union proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union withdraw their troops from the Korean Peninsula at the same time, and first implemented a unilateral withdrawal. The purpose was simply to express the Soviet Union's desire for peace in the Far East and urge the United States to withdraw its troops. . On the one hand, Moscow is content with controlling North Korea through the Communist Party. On the other hand, it believes that Kim Il Sung has the ability to confront the South and therefore can realize its vision of containing the United States on the Korean Peninsula without direct conflict. However, since the 38th parallel was drawn, North and South Korea have been in a state of tense confrontation. Kim Il-sung always believed that only through revolutionary war could all of Korea be liberated and reunified, while Syngman Rhee also advocated strengthening armaments and actively advancing northward. Especially after the North and South Korea established their own political institutions and the Soviet occupying forces withdrew from the Korean Peninsula, the situation on the Korean Peninsula worsened, and frictions and exchanges of fire near the 38th Parallel continued to occur. From the beginning of 1949, the Soviet Embassy in North Korea continued to send emergency telegrams to Moscow about possible attacks by South Korea. Kim Il Sung fully understood that to achieve his goals, he must obtain Moscow's approval and help, so he proposed a secret alliance with the Soviet Union. After being politely rejected by Moscow, Kim Il Sung proposed to meet Stalin directly to find out the Soviet Union's intentions and attitude. But at this time, Stalin's strategic focus was still in Europe. On the one hand, he established a socialist camp with Moscow as the center by establishing the Communist Intelligence Bureau and rectifying the Yugoslav Communist Party, aiming to stabilize the position against the West. On the other hand, in the face of the tough stance of the United States and Western countries, Stalin adopted a position of tolerance and retreat in the process of resolving the Berlin crisis. The understanding of the overall strength of both parties forced the Soviet Union to abandon the practice of open conflict with the United States. Under such circumstances, Stalin would naturally not agree to trigger a war on the Korean Peninsula that might lead to U.S. intervention. In his meeting with Kim Il-sung in early March, Stalin simply asked about the comparison of military strength between the North and the South and the results of small-scale military conflicts near the 38th parallel, and expressed satisfaction with Kim Il-sung's confident answer. As for the military assistance requested by Kim Il Sung, Moscow only agreed to help equip the two North Korean garrison brigades stationed on the 38th Line, and decided to allow the Soviet naval detachment to continue to stay in Chongjin Port to assist North Korea in its defense. By the summer of 1949, tensions between the North and the South had further intensified. Especially before and after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the South Korean Syngman Rhee regime continued to issue war cries and repeatedly carried out military provocations and border violations against the North. According to the briefings of Soviet Ambassador Shtykov and Kim Il-sung, "an operational plan for attacking the north has been formulated" and the attack will be launched in July. However, Stalin did not take any further action except for agreeing to increase weapons and equipment assistance to Pyongyang in response to Kim Il Sung's repeated requests to ensure that North Korea was not violated. Moscow even approved Shtykov's proposal to remove the Soviet naval base in Chongjin Port and military airports in Pyongyang and other places after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, so as to prevent these facilities from being used by the Korean People's Army, thus putting the Soviet Union in the international situation. in a passive position. The Soviet Union's proposition at this time was to establish the United Democratic Front of the Motherland in North Korea and achieve peaceful reunification through universal suffrage in all of North Korea. Kim Il Sung was unwilling to let his grand plan be blocked by Moscow, so he turned to test Chairman Mao's attitude. In May 1949, Kim Il Sung sent Kim Il, director of the Political Department of the People's Army, to secretly visit Peking to discuss with the leaders of the Communist Party of China the issue of organizing the Chinese People's Liberation Army into a Central Korean Division and transferring it to the People's Army, and expressed his intention to take military action. . Chairman Mao has always advocated that "power emerges from the barrel of a gun", so he would naturally support Kim Il Sung's idea. However, the revolutionary war in China has not yet ended, and the country has??With no reunification yet, it is difficult for the CCP to agree with North Korea's plan. Chairman Mao promised to transfer the two Korean divisions of the CCP army to North Korea when needed. If a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, the CCP "will provide all assistance within its capabilities, especially supplies and weapons for the above divisions." However, Chairman Mao "advised the Korean comrades" not to "launch an attack on South Korea but to wait for a more favorable situation" even if the United States withdrew its troops and the Japanese did not return. Despite this, Kim Il Sung did not give up. Facing the threat from the south, Kim Il Sung advocated changing from passive to active. He smugly believed that this was a favorable opportunity to achieve the reunification of Korea through military means. To this end, while actively mobilizing the army for defensive deployment, Kim Il Sung ordered the troops in the 38th Line area to enter a state of combat readiness in early July, and "decided to transfer the Korean Division of the Chinese People's Liberation Army back to North Korea: the Shenyang Division was deployed at Sinuiju, Changchun Division is deployed in Ronan." After preparations were made, on September 3, Kim Il Sung's personal secretary Moon Il informed the Soviet embassy that South Korea had recently attempted to seize parts of the Ongjin Peninsula north of the 38th parallel and shelled the cement factory in Haizhou City. Therefore, Kim Il-sung requested permission to take military action against the south to seize the Ongjin Peninsula and part of South Korea east of it to near Kaesong in order to shorten the defense line. If the international situation permits, we are also prepared to continue to advance to the south. Kim Il Sung believed that they could occupy South Korea within two weeks, or at most two months. After verifying the situation at Vyshinsky's request, Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in North Korea Donkin reported to Moscow on September 14 the details of the military forces of North and South Korea, Kim Il Sung's considerations, and his own views on this issue. The report said that "Kim Il Sung believed that the combat effectiveness of the South Korean army was not strong" and that the northern army "was superior to the southern army in terms of technical equipment, discipline, training quality of officers and soldiers, and morale." If the attack goes well, "you can continue to advance south." Kim Il-sung and Foreign Minister Park Heon-yong also believe that when a civil war breaks out in North Korea, the United States will not directly intervene with troops. But King himself believes that the local war planned by Kim Il Sung will inevitably lead to the outbreak of civil war in North Korea, and the northern army is not strong enough to win in a quick decisive battle. At the same time, "Whether it is military or political, a protracted civil war will be very dangerous to the North." unfavorable¡±. However, Ambassador Shtykov agreed with Kim Il Sung¡¯s plan. He believed that "the political status of the South Korean government is not solid" and that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is favorable to the North. Although he does not rule out the possibility that "the Americans will intervene in this conflict and provide active help to South Korea," and the number of the People's Army and the material power it possesses cannot yet guarantee the complete crushing of the southern army and the occupation of South Korea, he still It is believed that "it is possible and appropriate to develop the guerrilla movement in southern Korea and to provide various supports and leadership." Under favorable circumstances, it can be used to "occupy the South Koreans on the 38th Parallel's provocations" Ongjin Peninsula and Kaesong area.¡± After careful study and discussion, Moscow rejected Kim Il Sung¡¯s plan. On September 24, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a resolution, instructing Shtykov to declare to Kim Il Sung and Park Heon-yong in strict accordance with the text of the resolution: "Since the current armed forces of North Korea do not account for the indispensable amount compared with South Korea, advantage, so we have to admit that we are completely unprepared to attack the South now, so it is not allowed from a military point of view. "Since the guerrilla movement and mass struggle in the South have not been actively carried out, the work of establishing liberated areas and organizing people's uprisings has not been carried out. Little was done, and "from a political point of view, the attack on the South you propose is also unprepared." In addition, the local battle to attack the Ongjin Peninsula and occupy the Kaicheng area means "the beginning of the Korean Civil War", and the protracted nature of the war "may provide excuses for the Americans to carry out various interferences in Korean affairs." Therefore, ¡°the current task of striving for the reunification of Korea requires the greatest concentration of efforts: first, carry out guerrilla movements, establish liberated areas, and prepare for a nationwide uprising in Korea in order to overthrow the reactionary regime and successfully solve the task of reunifying the entire Korea; second, further strengthen the task of People's Army". Apparently, Stalin believed that conditions were not yet ripe for war in Korea. Stalin¡¯s decision frustrated Kim Il Sung, but although he reluctantly accepted Moscow¡¯s opinion, he continued to actively prepare for war. On October 14, another fierce battle broke out near the 38th parallel. The North Korean 3rd Guard Brigade attacked the South Korean troops that invaded the Fayin Mountain Highlands 1.5 kilometers north of the 38th Parallel and occupied these two highlands. Because the Soviet ambassador and military advisers participated in the discussion and acquiesced to this military action beforehand, but did not report it to Stalin afterwards, Moscow was extremely angry. Gromyko severely accused Shtykov of not "strictly and firmly" Implement the instruction "prohibiting any proposal to the North Korean government to take active actions against South Korea without the permission of the Central Committee" and the "Instruction of the Central Committee on preventing the situation at the 38th Line from complicating the situation" and give him a warning. However, just two months later, Stalin gave Kim Il Sung a pass to go to war. January 19, 1950??, Moscow received a report from Shtykov: After a small-scale banquet, Kim Il Sung excitedly told the Soviet embassy staff under the influence of wine that after China completed its liberation cause, the question now is how to Liberate the people in the south of the motherland. "The people of southern Korea trust me and count on our armed forces. The guerrillas cannot solve the problem. The people of the south know that we have an excellent army. I have been awake at night recently, thinking about how to solve the problem of unifying the country. If southern Korea is liberated If the affairs of the people and the reunification of the motherland are delayed, then I will lose the trust of the Korean people." Kim Il Sung hoped to "meet with Stalin to discuss the situation in the south and launch an attack on Rhee Syngman's army." If he could not meet Stalin, then he wanted to meet Chairman Mao. Kim Il-sung also accused the Soviet Union of not allowing him to attack the Ongjin Peninsula, otherwise the People's Army would succeed within three days. "If a full-scale offensive is launched, Seoul can be entered within a few days." Unlike the evasive attitude adopted by the Soviet embassy staff, this time Stalin unexpectedly changed his mind. After some consideration, Stalin personally called back on January 30 and said: I understand Comrade Kim Il Sung¡¯s dissatisfaction, but he should understand that he needs to be fully prepared if he wants to take such a major step against South Korea. The thing had to be organized so as not to take too many risks. If he wants to talk to me about it, I'm ready to meet him and talk to him. Please convey this to Kim Il Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter. In order to strengthen North Korea's military strength and the organizational and command capabilities of the People's Army, Moscow agreed to Kim Il Sung's establishment of three more infantry divisions and to use the loan that the Soviet government would provide in 1951 in 1950 to provide for the newly formed troops. Buy Soviet equipment. Stalin also appointed Lieutenant General Vasilyev as the General Military Advisor of the Korean People's Army, replacing Soviet Ambassador Shtykov who had held this position concurrently since the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from North Korea. After that, the Soviet Union began to provide weapons and equipment to North Korea on a large scale. On March 9, North Korea sent a note to the Soviet Union, "In order to replenish the People's Army with equipment, ammunition and technical equipment and strengthen the People's Army, the Soviet government is requested to provide North Korea with military supplies of 120-130 million rubles in 1950 in accordance with the application form previously submitted to the Soviet government. Technical equipment", North Korea accordingly guaranteed to provide the Soviet Union with gold, silver and molybdenum concentrate worth 133 million rubles. Subsequently, Kim Il Sung provided a detailed list of required weapons and equipment. Moscow responded immediately, agreeing that North Korea could use the 1951 loan to purchase weapons and equipment in advance. Stalin also personally called Kim Il Sung to tell him that the Soviet government had decided to "fully meet your request" for the "equipment, ammunition and technical equipment required by the Korean People's Army". While making material preparations, on March 20, Kim Il Sung requested a secret visit to Moscow in early April and proposed that he would discuss with Stalin "the ways and methods for the reunification of the country's north and south" and "economic development prospects" and other issues. In a list of "problems that Kim Il Sung asked Comrade Stalin to help solve", it was clearly written: "As for the ways and methods to unify the country, it is planned to use armed means to unify." It was under this premise that the Korean War ended The shot was fired at around four o'clock in the morning on June 25, 1950. Chen Er stayed up all night that night, keeping his eyes on the north. The fighting was raging thousands of kilometers away. It was the firing of this shot that heralded the victory of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Coming soon. ¡ª¡ª ¡ª¡ªThank you for your support, I will keep working hard, please collect and recommend ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !