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Text Chapter 123 The Conflict between Wild Road and Regularization

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    Now commanders at all levels of the customs forces rely more on their own personal abilities on the battlefield. In this case, it is okay to command simple infantry operations, but to command a synthetic, even semi-synthetic, force  Fighting a synthetic battle is a bit difficult.  .

    During the period when he arrived at the Guan Nei Army, Lin Zhiqiang also discovered that the overall professional level of the staff of most of the troops within the Guan Nei was actually much lower than the actual needs. These staffs were not so much operational staff as some department administrators, or even lower-level troops.  reserve commander.

    Except for high-level headquarters and individual units, the number of staff officers at most brigade and regiment levels is either insufficient or their level is too poor. Some staff officers can't even make a simple map.  The training and education are not enough. Except for a few talents trained by large military regions, most of the staff officers have false reputations.

    In many cases, these staff officers are not staff officers who should be staff officers, and they are blind staff officers who should not be staff officers, especially at the regiment level. This is even more serious. The combat staff officers cannot read maps, and the communications staff officers cannot play with radios. On the battlefield, they still cannot  He often takes the lead in charge on behalf of lower-level commanders. This is very different from the situation where the chief of staff of the Anti-Japanese Alliance has great authority and the staff officers at all levels have a clear division of labor and what to do.

    Ever since the troops came out of the border, even as early as the formation of this brigade, and since Lin Zhiqiang was appointed as the chief of staff of the brigade, they did not get along well with the brigade commander of the vanguard brigade. It was not because of other reasons, but the two sides had mutual differences in some military affairs.  There are too many differences in concepts and some march deployments.

    The combat environment inside and outside the pass is different, the enemy situation is different, and the actual surrounding situation is even more different, which leads to a huge difference in the military concepts of the two sides. Especially when he and the pass are transferred to the Northeast, he has experienced both battlefields inside and outside the pass.  The people who are different are different. They are cadres who were born and raised in the Anti-Japanese Federation. The gap between the two sides in some aspects is even greater.

    The leading brigade commander of the troops leaving the customs had served as the main regiment commander as early as in the Red Army. After arriving in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, he served as the commander of the military division, and his position has always been the most critical in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.  The position and the long-term self-sufficient military struggle life make this leading brigade commander not only have the ability to take charge of his own affairs, but also have extremely rich practical experience.

    More importantly, in the long-term and arduous struggle, it has formed its own set of military theories. Although in terms of infantry and artillery coordination and contract tactics, it can be said that it is basically limited by its own vision and the long-term lack of heavy equipment in the customs troops.  None, but his actual combat skills are extremely solid. When it comes to guerrilla warfare and mountain mobile warfare, he can be called an expert.

    You know, the Guannai Army is a military division organized according to a division of the Anti-Alliance Force. There are only a few mortars, and the shells are as precious as gold. They are absolutely reluctant to use them. I just want to  With experience in this area, there is no place to learn. If you want to engage in coordinated operations with multiple arms, there is no such condition. Basic artillery is lacking, let alone other heavy equipment.

    Moreover, the conditions of the troops inside and outside the pass are different, and the application of some basic infantry tactics is also very different. Due to the limitations of equipment and ammunition, the troops inside the pass focus more on hand-to-hand combat, ambush warfare, and mountain mobile warfare. As for fire suppression, they mainly rely on sharpshooters and  A small number of machine guns.

    However, some basic infantry tactical training, as well as the use of infantry firepower, are too different from the anti-alliance tactical training that Yang Zhen personally planned and planned. There is no way, if the conditions are not good, we can only follow the existing conditions. Almost all grassroots cadres who came out of the regular military academy  No, the equipment conditions are extremely poor, and all tactical training can only be done according to your own conditions.

    This also results in the fact that the combat styles and tactics of the regiment-level combat units in the entire army are not the same. Even the three regiments under a brigade also have three combat styles. It can be said that a hundred flowers bloom, each with its own tricks.  With one brigade and three regiments, there are actually three different combat command styles. I am afraid this is the only one in the world.

    Unlike the later years of the Liberation War, when various units were successively organized into columns and brigade-level combined combat units, most of the 18th Army at this time still used the regiment level as its basic combat unit. That is to say, under the condition of dispersed guerrillas,  Each army is actually based on the regiment as its combat unit.

    But it was precisely these so-called wild men in the eyes of some regular troops that a master was beaten to death by random punches. The Japanese officers who had received strict training suffered great losses in the mountain warfare in North China. Although because of  Equipment and training could not change the situation of the war, but they also prevented a large number of Japanese troops from going south.

    The equipment of the Guanhai troops is poor. If a regiment can have five heavy machine guns and a platoon can have one light machine gun, it will be considered the absolute main force. If it has one or two mortars, it will be the trump card of the entire military region.  , with few machine guns, a severe shortage of ammunition, and even fewer heavy firearms.?As for the artillery, don't even think about it. Even if you want to engage in some infantry-machine collaborative training or infantry-artillery collaborative training, you can't do it.

    The reason is very simple. We don¡¯t have the capital to do it. Although the equipment is now available, due to time constraints, although the training level of the troops has improved to a certain extent, there is still a certain gap between the capabilities of commanders at all levels and the actual needs. The main reason is that  This is reflected in the lack of proficiency and mastery in the use of artillery. Even the configuration and use of machine guns are difficult to operate freely.

    Most of the time, the task of the machine gun is to shoot where there are more people. As for fire suppression and blockade, there are not so many bullets to waste, and there is no need. Moreover, most cadres below the battalion who have not received formal military education have not  I don¡¯t know how to deploy the focus of machine gun firepower.

    In most cases, when cadres at all levels command operations, they still rely on the wild paths they have honed during the long war. When commanding on the battlefield, they also rely more on the experience they have accumulated over the years, that is,  A graduate of War University who makes many people proud.

    Although the senior leaders of each army have repeatedly wanted to strengthen the training and education of grassroots cadres, especially military cadres, each division set up its own camp school when crossing the Yellow River eastward. However, due to restrictions,  Most cadre education can only remain in the initial stage. Except for a few middle- and high-level cadres who entered the Anti-Japanese University, most of them still learned on the battlefield.

    This is also the reason why after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the central government immediately established higher military academies and a large number of infantry schools to conduct rotational training for various units from senior commanders to grassroots commanders. Even this kind of training was used even in the most intense and final battles of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.  Even when military cadres were needed, they did not stop.

    The unique military theory formed through long-term training has caused a large number of commanders in the troops to form a deep-rooted belief in their minds that they should only believe in their own ideas.  In their opinion, those plans are good and good, but the key point is that they are not suitable for their own troops.

    Of course, they are still very willing to see the improvement of the tactical level of their troops. After all, no commander wants to see his troops suffer too many casualties due to the use of their troops' tactics in battle. Although they have made great progress in learning on the battlefield,  , but the casualties are also greater.

    Veterans are equally important to the [***] troops on the frontal battlefield or to the 18th Army operating behind enemy lines. Therefore, these commanders are still very optimistic about the improvement of the tactical level of their troops.  Yes, but the command on the battlefield is still insensitive.

    For those who analyze and judge the progress of the battle, propose various plans and other staff work, they believe more in their own judgment and sense of smell on the battlefield. In their opinion, if the commander and staff can do the work,  What else does a commander do? It is better to leave the troops under the command of a group of staff officers.

    Before the attack on the leading brigade this time, Lin Zhiqiang had repeatedly suggested that the troops should move closer to each other. If they did not want to move closer to each other, then the three regiments should form an intersecting and zigzag formation. Once they encountered the Japanese and puppet troops,  For sneak attacks, various units can coordinate with each other.

    At the same time, each regiment is required to organize on-duty firepower consisting of light and heavy machine guns and mortars. The brigade must also establish on-duty firepower based on the mountain artillery company. The situation around each regiment's station must be marked out in advance. Once encountered,  The Japanese attack can be suppressed immediately with firepower.

    When each regiment chooses a location, it is best to control the surrounding commanding heights and set up simple defenses. When each unit is resting, try not to choose a village. The regiment-level units must be absolutely gathered together.  , there can be no dispersed garrison situation.

    However, these suggestions of his were directly rejected by the leading brigade commander without hesitation. The reason was very simple in the view of the leading brigade commander: "Once the Japanese army really comes for a sneak attack, with the firepower configuration of the Japanese army, if the three regiments get closer,  If so, one shell will cause heavy casualties to the troops. Although the current equipment level of the troops has been greatly improved, it is still far behind the Japanese army. "

    As for other suggestions, apart from controlling the surrounding commanding heights as much as possible, they were basically not adopted. Villages were chosen as rest areas. Once encountering an enemy situation, there would be a relatively stable position to rely on. As for on-duty firepower, for the troops inside the pass,  What a waste of ammunition.

    Even if they are surrounded by strong enemies, they can still rely on the villages to persist until they escape after dark. Even if the troops are dispersed, they can still escape under the cover of the common people. This is a method that has been tried and tested by the internal troops on the battlefield behind enemy lines. On duty  The firepower is not used at all, and whatever ammunition is available, it would be better to use it on the battlefield.

    In the eyes of these commanders, night fighting is the only way toWhat is our strength? As long as we rely on the villages to persist until dark, we will not be afraid no matter how many Japanese and puppet troops come. With the villages can be used as ready-made fortifications, why bother sleeping in the wild and expending so much effort to go there?  What simple fortifications to make.

    Differences in key military concepts make Lin Zhiqiang, the chief of staff, very frustrated. At least he thinks so. But as a soldier, he knows that obeying orders is his bounden duty. Although due to different concepts, the suggestions are rarely accepted.  Although he accepted it, he still upheld the most basic morals of a soldier and did his job conscientiously. It was just work as work, but let alone the frustration in his heart.
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