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Text Chapter 117: Problems with internal troops

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    However, although this operation brought many difficulties and dilemmas to subsequent local work, the effect was obvious. With the large amount of wood that could be demolished to build pontoon bridges, even if it encountered a relatively large river obstruction, the marching speed of the troops could not be improved  He wasn't delayed too long either.

    As for the time delayed by the enemy's blockade, it was not even as long as the time required for the forced demolition. Although the number of Japanese and puppet troops guarding the East and West Ujimqin banners was large, they had the ability to compete with such an army.  , not to mention that these people do not have anti-tank weapons and do not know how to deal with these iron guys who are not afraid of bullets.

    Even most of them, like their colleagues on the border, don't even know what the iron guys are that are rushing toward them with tongues of fire. What they only know is that these giant iron bodies are in their hands.  Neither the rifle nor the machine gun could stop it.

    Under the impact of the armored brigade regardless of firepower and attrition, the puppet Mongolian army collapsed just like their colleagues on the border. The blocking of a small number of Japanese troops also had no effect due to the lack of anti-tank weapons. In addition, Wang Guangyu also  Deliberately avoiding places where the Japanese and puppet troops stationed heavy troops allowed the troops to advance very quickly.

    Just here, Wang Guangyu was clearing roads through mountains and building bridges across rivers, commanding mechanized troops to forcefully assault the station of the 23rd Linxi Division. They were only a few hundred kilometers away from them at the junction of Paddock and Longhua in Rehe.  In a small mountain village, a meeting of cadres above the regiment level was being held for the Jire-Liaoning Army that had left the border. As for the content of the meeting, there was only one thing, which was a summary of the previous battles.

    At the meeting, the commander of the 129th Division, who was currently commanding the advance of the New Hebei Re-Liaoning Army in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and the Taihang Military Region, as well as most of the 129th Division¡¯s effective forces, looked very unhappy. The reason was very simple.  Because most of the troops did not fight well before, a large part of his worries before the war became a reality. Many problems occurred in various troops during the battle.

    After leaving the customs, the vanguard troops used mobile ambush tactics to win a great victory. Many troops underestimated the enemy. They believed that they were unable to compete head-on with the Japanese and puppet troops because their equipment was not good and the ammunition was scarce. As long as the equipment was  Up there, there was nothing to fear from the Japanese and puppet troops. After winning the first battle, a large part of the troops relaxed their guard against the Japanese counterattack.

    Not only is there a lingering feeling of underestimating the enemy among a considerable number of troops, but some troops have more or less relapsed into the old habits of long-term dispersed guerrilla warfare. Without orders from their superiors, they dispersed their troops to get supplies or go to other places without permission.  To make a fortune, the result was that they underestimated the enemy or dispersed their troops, unable to concentrate in a short period of time, and suffered heavy losses due to the rapid counterattack of the Japanese army.

    A brigade, the vanguard of the entire army, encountered the Japanese troops marching west from Chifeng. Although they repelled the sneak attacks of the Japanese and puppet troops after several bloody battles, they suffered considerable casualties during the battle. Three regiments  Among them, one main regiment suffered casualties and more than half were captured, and another regiment suffered one-third casualties.

    If the commander of the brigade had not been decisive, under the unfavorable situation, he quickly put the last regiment in his hands to press the entire line, and concentrated the artillery cover of the entire brigade, defeating part of the puppet Manchukuo troops serving as flank cover from the flanks.  , causing the Japanese and puppet troops to retreat because their flanks were exposed. Otherwise, the leading brigade might be eaten by the Japanese and puppet troops. The emergence of this situation made the old commander very angry.

    When the battle turned out like this, not only did the commanders at all levels have problems themselves, but there were also many problems with the coordination among the troops. There were also a lot of problems with the coordination of infantry and artillery and the use of the most basic tactics. Even in terms of discipline, there were also problems.  Something went wrong.

    Before the battle started, a regiment of the vanguard brigade dispersed two battalions to get food without receiving any orders. The other regiment served as flank cover for the entire army and guarded Chifeng. This was learned during the interrogation of the prisoners.  More than 30 kilometers north of their base, there was a Japanese and puppet warehouse that supplied materials to various tribes in Weichang County and stored a large amount of strategic materials such as grain, cloth, and kerosene. Without asking their superiors, they concentrated two battalions and attacked.  .

    As a result, when the regiment that was supposed to be guarding the flanks encountered the Japanese and puppet troops, only one battalion plus a team directly affiliated with the regiment fought. Moreover, this battalion, due to carelessness, relaxed its guard and was attacked by the Japanese and puppet troops. During the melee, the weapons were  Most of the heavy machine guns were scattered and all the heavy machine guns were lost.

    During the melee, the battalion commander among the cadres at all levels of the battalion died. The instructor was captured and immediately killed by the Japanese and puppet troops. All six company commanders and instructors except one instructor were sacrificed. Two-thirds of the cadres at all levels were also lost.  , especially the squad platoon leader and backbone, suffered even more heavy losses, and most of the soldiers in the battalion were killed or captured.

    What¡¯s more serious is that the battalion not only suffered huge losses, but also suffered losses from the battalion it was covering.The regiment headquarters and directly affiliated teams also suffered considerable losses. The wounded in the regiment's health team were unable to be evacuated quickly, so they were all captured and massacred by the Japanese and puppet troops. The regiment's mortar company was also captured as a result of the Japanese sneak attack.

    Among the several regiment leaders, except for the regiment chief of staff who led the team to attack the Japanese and puppet warehouses and survived, the regiment leaders who stayed behind suffered heavy casualties. Among them, the regiment leader was seriously injured, the political commissar died, and the deputy regiment leader was injured after being surrounded by the Japanese and puppet troops.  , in order to avoid being captured and committing suicide, the director of the regiment's political office disappeared during the battle, and the radio station was also lost in the melee.

    The unauthorized actions of these two regiments caused the leading brigade to fall into passivity in a very short period of time when encountering the Japanese counterattack, and relaxed their vigilance, which also caused serious losses to themselves. Originally faced with the counterattack,  The Japanese and puppet troops' superior strength turned into a disadvantage.

    As for the troops they sent out to collect food without permission, due to communication and distance reasons, they have been unable to be transferred back. Not to mention the regiment that took action without permission to collect food, one battalion also encountered puppet troops with the cooperation of two Japanese cavalry squadrons.  A cavalry regiment and an infantry regiment of the Manchu army surrounded them.

    If the battalion commander hadn't been quite capable, and after discovering the Japanese and puppet troops being surrounded by surroundings, he would have seized the highest hilltop in the surrounding area to block the attack. The battalion might have been completely lost, even though the main force of the battalion was saved because of the battalion commander's quick response.  They survived, but a company that served as a cover was all sacrificed under the successive attacks of the Japanese and puppet cavalry in order to cover the transfer of the brigade, and no one survived.

    After discovering the enemy attack, during the counterattack carried out by the brigade, although the brigade concentrated all artillery fire and light and heavy machine guns to cover the only complete main regiment left on hand to detour from the flanks, there were also incidents during the battle.  The problem of disjointed coordination between infantry and artillery.

    During the counterattack, the commander of the brigade still had some petty problems. He controlled the artillery in his own hands. The artillery personnel had no suggestions on how many shells to fire during the battle, when to fire, and where to hit the shells.  They can only obey the orders of the brigade commander.

    The commander was too unfamiliar with artillery command, which resulted in the fact that not only the infantry here rushed forward, but the artillery over there still hadn't fired a single shell, or the artillery preparations had been completed for more than ten minutes, but the infantry here hadn't fired yet.  Even in order to save artillery shells, after the first-line battle entered close combat, the artillery did not suppress the second-line enemy forces and block enemy reinforcements.

    This kind of tactical use made artillery play little role in the battle. The brigade even participated in the battle with a mountain artillery battery of six guns, an infantry artillery battery of four 92 infantry guns, and two 37 combat anti-aircraft guns.  Twelve artillery pieces, under the blind command of their superiors, all the first wave of shells failed to hit the target.

    Although all the artillery of the brigade were mobilized to participate in the battle, the commander of the brigade evenly distributed the use of artillery, just like handing out clothes. Several guns were fired in each direction. During the battle, the artillery firepower did not form a key target.  Instead, a front-line pressure approach was adopted. The ten artillery pieces of the two artillery companies did not form an artillery group to participate in the battle. Instead, they each selected their targets and formed a tactic of fighting independently.

    When the Japanese artillery fire counterattacked, they did not know to move their positions. After the fire cover was completed, the people below put forward rational suggestions for moving their positions, but they were criticized as being greedy for life and fear of death. As a result, the artillery of the brigade was killed when the Japanese and puppet troops counterattacked the artillery fire.  The losses were heavy. In addition to the infantry artillery and combat defense artillery, which lost only one combat defense artillery piece due to their lightness and rapid transfer, half of the six mountain guns were lost.

    Not only were serious mistakes made in the use of artillery, but even the most basic use of light and heavy machine guns and grenades was not designated to focus on suppressing targets. After the battle started, all light and heavy machine guns fired continuously, which was a huge waste of ammunition.  The battle was about to consume all the machine gun ammunition carried by the brigade.

    Moreover, during the battle, the light and heavy machine guns were evenly placed in a line, without forming a trapezoidal configuration according to the range. These machine guns, all placed on the front line, suffered heavy losses in the artillery fire of the Japanese and puppet counterattacks, and a regiment participating in the battle mortared  The artillery battery ran in the wrong direction during the movement and was covered by long-range artillery fire from the Japanese and puppet troops, resulting in all losses.

    When launching an attack, no one thinks about which part is covering, which part is charging, which part is the main attacker, which part is assisting, which part is the reserve team, the deployment of troops and equipment is all based on egalitarianism, and everything is done at every turn.  The regiment goes into battle.

    As soon as the battle started, there were only a few cadres of the regiment, including battalion and regiment level cadres, who were in their command positions. They all rushed out. Even the deputy commander of the regiment left his troops and took the lead in the charge. There were only a few cadres in the command post.  Retaining a director of the Political Department was brave in this situation, and it indeed boosted morale.

    However, during the battle, he was separated from his command position, resulting in poor communication between the head and tail of the troops. The following troops requested instructions from the command post.No one responded, which also caused heavy casualties among the cadres. Among the six regular battalion cadres of the three battalions of the regiment, except for one instructor who was not injured during the battle, the remaining five sacrificed one, and the remaining  All were wounded. The deputy commander who led the charge and fought with the puppet Manchukuo army with bayonets was also seriously injured during the battle.

    Even after the battle started, there was no telephone line between the frontline troops and the command post behind them. Communication between the front and rear still relied on correspondents and buglers. After the correspondents and buglers were knocked out by precise fire from the Japanese and puppet troops, the entire unit communicated with each other.  All communication links were interrupted, and each battalion and even each company fell into a situation of fighting on its own.
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